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Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,” and The 
First Amendment 
Andrew Tutt∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Whatever else it is, speech is also frequently a commodity. Many 
of the products and services people purchase also happen to be speech. 
Books, magazines, movies, driving directions, relationship counseling, 
financial advice, and bulk data do not begin to scratch the surface of 
the examples one might give. Conversely, people also regularly pay for 
silence. They purchase the right to have their secrets kept, their 
confidences respected, and their reputations shielded. In commercial 
settings, the government frequently intervenes to mandate disclosure 
or decree silence—prohibiting materially misleading statements in 
securities markets, requiring warning labels in product markets, and 
prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. 
What is particularly interesting about markets in products and 
services that happen to be speech is that they blossom in the First 
Amendment’s shadow. The Supreme Court once famously said 
“[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”1 Yet, to a notable extent, numerous laws 
governing transactions in speech markets prohibit or require speech 
on precisely those bases. Courts and scholars are still grasping for a 
theory that safeguards important First Amendment values and makes 
sense of the doctrine.2 Some prominent scholars appear to believe that 
 
∗ Attorney-Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. The views expressed in 
this Article are the author’s only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of 
Justice or the Office of Legal Counsel. The author wishes to thank the participants at the 2015 
Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference who provided invaluable feedback on an earlier 
draft, especially Ariel Bendor who provided a comprehensive critique. The author also wishes 
to thank Claudia Haupt for her thoughtful comments. 
 1. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 2. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1784–85 (2004) (explaining 
that “however hard we try to theorize about the First Amendment’s boundaries, and however 
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there is no general principle and that courts should work case by case 
to weigh the First Amendment values at stake.3 
This Article makes the provocative claim that there is a general 
principle governing the “commoditized speech” cases, one that 
credibly safeguards First Amendment values and that judges can 
manage. This Article terms that principle the “bargain fairness” model 
of First Amendment review. The test is as follows: when economic 
regulations equalize the relative bargaining power between parties 
negotiating over products and services that also happen to be or 
involve speech, the Court defers; when economic regulations have 
other purposes, the Court intervenes. The fair bargain conception, 
simple as it is, is highly consilient and explains a range of seemingly 
unrelated First Amendment holdings. It explains why the Court 
strikes down laws preventing people from purchasing movies, 
videogames, books, and prescriber-identifying information, while also 
explaining why the Court upholds laws permitting people to sue 
promise-breaking newspapers, magazines that publish unauthorized 
excerpts from forthcoming books, lawyers for malpractice, and 
employers for sexual harassment.4 It also helps explain the structure of 
the murky law of unconstitutional conditions—why, in particular, a 
public school teacher cannot be fired for publishing a letter to the 
editor critical of the local schoolboard but a prosecutor can be fired 
for circulating an office-wide questionnaire critical of management.5 
Additionally, it helps explain why the courts permit greater speech 
regulation in circumstances involving financial monopolies. In all of 
 
successful such theorizing might be as a normative enterprise, efforts at anything close to an 
explanation of the existing terrain of coverage and noncoverage are unavailing.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from 
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251–82 (1983) (arguing 
that the court employs an “eclectic” approach to First Amendment cases in which “a number of 
variables interact in complex ways” and suggesting that this approach is normatively attractive). 
 4. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (striking down ban on 
videogame sales); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down ban on 
purchase of prescriber-identifying information); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) 
(permitting hostile workplace sexual harassment claims); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 
663 (1991) (permitting promissory-estoppel suit against newspaper for failing to keep promise 
to keep source’s identity confidential); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539 (1985) (permitting copyright infringement action against magazine publishing 
unauthorized excerpts from forthcoming presidential memoir). 
 5. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (permitting firing for circulating 
questionnaire); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (invalidating firing for 
publishing letter to the editor). 
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these circumstances, the Court applies bargain fairness review to the 
laws at issue. 
Beyond its explanatory power, there are reasons to regard the 
bargain fairness model as a normatively adequate compromise 
between competing approaches the Court might have taken to address 
the relationship between the First Amendment and economic 
regulation. First, the bargain fairness model is judicially manageable. 
Judges engaged in First Amendment balancing in the commoditized 
speech context try to figure out whether the regulation is designed to 
ensure that the bargain between the parties is fair—that is, that the 
regulation is designed to give a leg up to the less powerful or dominant 
party. The fair bargain conception also opens space for speech 
regulation in the commercial sphere that does not pose a significant 
risk of spillover censorship—in other words, a risk of First Amendment 
under-enforcement in non-commercial circumstances. Finally, because 
speech regulations that enhance bargain fairness often resemble typical 
regulations in other product and service markets,6 they do not carry 
the stigma of state-sponsored censorship even when, in practical 
effect, they censor. 
To be sure, there are problems with the fair bargain conception. 
One might argue that permitting extensive regulation of speech 
anywhere demeans speech everywhere, even in transactional settings. 
And the fair bargain conception is circular to some degree. The value 
of speech is influenced by judicial determinations about its value, and 
thus the government can incrementally eliminate certain types of 
speech from the marketplace by slowly paring it back in the interests 
of fair bargains. But the normative problems with the fair bargain 
conception are not insurmountable, and its incidental impacts on First 
Amendment values are probably much smaller than its benefits to 
public welfare.7 
 
 6. For example, laws that protect workplace safety are similar to laws against sexual 
harassment in the workplace; laws that prevent companies from disclaiming personal injury 
liability for injuries arising from unsafe and defective products are similar to laws that prevent 
professionals from disclaiming malpractice liability for failure to provide adequate professional 
services. For more on the scope of First Amendment protections for professional speech, see 
Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017). 
 7. Cf. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 
2171–72 (2015) (explaining that “absent the distinction between high- and low-value speech, 
it would be much more difficult for the government to justify its regulation of the commercial 
marketplace, its ability to impose criminal sanctions on speech that facilitates or is otherwise 
closely connected to criminal behavior or its efforts to maintain basic standards of public conduct 
by prohibiting (for example) threatening and defamatory speech”). 
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Two additional threshold questions are worth addressing at the 
outset. First, a careful reader might question why this Article begins 
from the premise that all content- and speaker-based regulations are 
presumptively unconstitutional. Many First Amendment scholars 
approach First Amendment questions from a different premise, 
arguing that judicial protection for speech should only extend to types 
of speech that have qualities that make speech special or important. 
Second, careful readers might question whether the claims in this 
Article are descriptive or normative or both. If the Article is meant to 
be descriptive, they might also ask what kind of descriptive account 
it offers. 
To address the first question, this Article begins from the premise 
that all content- and speaker-based regulations are presumptively 
unconstitutional because that is the premise of the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine. The Court recently reiterated its view, in Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based 
on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional,” 
and that “laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict 
scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content 
preference.”8 The puzzle this Article seeks to solve is why a narrow 
class of content- and speaker-based speech restrictions—namely, a 
subset of laws regulating the market for commoditized speech—
escapes that searching scrutiny. 
To be sure, many scholars approach First Amendment questions 
in a different way. They begin with a grand theory that they use to 
distinguish speech that should be judicially protected from speech that 
should not be judicially protected. Robert Post, for example, has 
argued that speech warrants protection to the degree it promotes 
democratic legitimacy by permitting individuals to contribute to the 
formation of public discourse.9 For Post, and for scholars who 
approach the First Amendment in a similar way, when the reasons for 
 
 8. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2230 (2015). 
 9. See Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s 
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1303, 1323 (2009) (“Post concludes that the purpose of the First Amendment is to 
‘safeguard[] . . . public discourse from regulations that are inconsistent with democratic 
legitimacy.’”) (quoting Robert C. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000)); see also Post, supra, at 2368 (“[T]he 
participatory approach understands the First Amendment . . . as safeguarding the ability of 
individual citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion.”). 
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treating speech as special do not support protection for a certain class 
or category of speech, it should not be protected.10 This Article takes 
a different approach because its claim is basically an exercise in 
constructive interpretation. Its purpose is to take the Court’s doctrine 
at face value but then to identify circumstances in which the Court 
does not enforce that doctrine to the letter and discuss some possible 
reasons why.  
To address the second question, this Article is interpretive, and 
therefore both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in the sense 
that it seeks to establish that the Court upholds laws that tend to 
equalize bargaining power between parties to a transaction involving 
commoditized speech. To be clear, this Article does not claim that the 
Court explicitly applies a fair bargain test in its commoditized speech 
cases. Rather, this Article offers an explanation and a justification for 
the fact that the Court upholds laws that tend to equalize bargaining 
power in spite of its formal doctrine, which seem to call for heightened 
scrutiny in many such cases. This Article is normative in the sense that 
it argues that the Court should formally adopt the bargain fairness 
test. In support of that claim, the Article contends that the bargain 
fairness test strikes a reasonable balance between free expression and 
social welfare. 
This Article has four parts. Part I discusses examples of the kinds 
of laws that the government might impose involving commoditized 
speech. Part II offers a more in-depth explanation of scholarly and 
doctrinal confusion regarding the interaction between the First 
Amendment and commoditized speech. Part III demonstrates how a 
wide range of First Amendment issues are best understood as 
concerned with ensuring bargain fairness. Part IV concludes with 
thoughts on the normative issues involved in treating bargain fairness 
as a preeminent value sufficient to permit extensive regulation of 
speech in the commercial sphere. 
 
 10. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 169 (2007) (“Speech outside of public discourse, by contrast, does not merit these 
[First Amendment] protections, because autonomy of speech in such contexts is not necessary 
to ensure the democratic legitimation safeguarded by the First Amendment.”); Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2000) (arguing that the 
subordinate status of commercial speech in First Amendment doctrine should be attributed to 
the fact that it “consists of communication about commercial matters that conveys information 
necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of public discourse”). 
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I. EXAMPLES OF ISSUES RAISED BY COMMODITIZED SPEECH 
Commoditized speech is a category with a clear core and fuzzy 
edges. As an initial matter, all speech that is bought and sold is subject 
to some general market regulations, such as contract law, even when 
the operation of that law results in the suppression of core protected 
speech.11 But some flavors of speech are even more commodity-like 
than others. In general, archetypical commoditized speech is speech 
that (1) is bought and sold in a commercial setting, (2) is sought (or 
silenced) by a motive for private gain rather than a desire for social 
change, (3) is not generally regarded as useful or harmful because of 
its capacity to persuade individuals to alter their beliefs, (4) is 
exchanged in a one-to-one manner, rather than broadcast in a one-to-
many manner, and (5) is useful for accomplishing a narrow or 
specific task.12 
Typical commoditized speech exhibits all of the factors above. For 
example, software programs are sold in a commercial setting generally 
out of a motive for private gain rather than social change, because of 
their usefulness as tools for accomplishing specific tasks. In addition, 
software programs are not usually intended to convey a political 
message, nor generally valued because they do so. Thus, although 
software programs meet the formal criteria for recognition as speech—
and indeed, videogames are protected speech13—they are subject to 
ubiquitous commercial regulation, just like other products.14 Maps 
and navigational charts are similar archetypical examples of 
commoditized speech.15 They are widely seen as consumer products, 
valued for their practical benefits, not as speech. 
Much speech exhibits some but not all of the indicia of 
commoditization. It is with respect to this type of speech that 
questions most frequently arise regarding the application of the First 
Amendment to regulation of the speech at issue. 
Consider social networking websites. Social networks are plainly 
places where lots of core protected First Amendment activity takes 
 
 11. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667–71 (1991). 
 12. Cf. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1800–07 (proposing similar factors as indicia of First 
Amendment coverage generally). 
 13. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[V]ideo games 
qualify for First Amendment protection.”). 
 14. See Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2012). 
 15. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1802. 
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place. Yet such networks frequently write contracts authorizing 
themselves to collect, use, and share individuals’ personal information 
in vague, ambiguous, and sweeping terms.16 The social networks may 
be using individuals’ personal information to improve their service, or 
to sell it to advertisers, or both. Their contracts thus implicate a speech 
commodity—an individual’s personal information—in circumstances 
that intertwine its collection and use with protected First Amendment 
speech. An open question is whether the government may regulate 
that transaction—for example, by creating a default rule that, in 
circumstances in which certain consumer personal data is collected, 
such collection is presumptively unauthorized unless the terms and 
conditions are set forth with precision.17 
Or consider internet mapping products and GPS devices. Such 
devices provide people with useful information and therefore fall 
within the First Amendment’s domain.18 But individuals also 
frequently rely on directions from mapping services and GPS devices 
in real time (usually while driving). An open question is whether the 
government may make it unlawful for services that provide driving 
directions to disclaim personal injury liability when faulty directions 
cause an accident. 
Also consider search engines. As gatekeepers to the Internet, 
search engines undoubtedly play one of the most significant and likely 
protectable First Amendment roles in society. Many individuals are 
unaware, however, that search engines do not promise that their 
results are accurate, unbiased, or truthful.19 Indeed, search engines 
occasionally slant search results for commercial gain. An open 
question is whether the government may mandate that search engines 
periodically obtain acknowledgment from users that users are aware 
that the results may be biased or inaccurate. 
The purpose of this Article is to show that each of those 
regulations would implicitly (and should explicitly) be analyzed under 
 
 16. See Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 252–53 nn.46–
50 (2014) (cataloging Terms of Use policies offered by Google, Facebook, Wikipedia, and 
others that permit those platforms to freely take and use user-data and user-generated content). 
 17. For a discussion of the state of academic legal scholarship addressing this question, 
see Part II, infra. 
 18. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–71 (2011). 
 19. Kristen Purcell, Joanna Brenner & Lee Rainie, Search Engine Use 2012: Main 
Findings, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/03/09/main-
findings-11/. 
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the bargain fairness test. That is, the question the Court should ask is 
whether the purpose and effect of the regulation is to regulate the 
fairness of the bargain between the consumer and the service or 
product provider, and not for some other reason. 
II. THE LITERATURE ON COMMODITIZED SPEECH20 
Debates about commercial speech are as fierce and fraught as ever. 
But commercial speech, which the Court has emphasized is defined 
narrowly to include only advertisements and proposals for commercial 
transactions,21 is a thin slice of the speech that people buy and sell 
every day. To the degree law regulates speech in our society, contracts 
play the largest role. In the workplace, employers use contracts to 
impose limits on employee speech.22 In planned communities, 
residents use contracts to impose restrictions on how their neighbors 
engage in speech on their property.23 In the marketplace, customers 
use contracts to control the speech of those with whom they do 
business in countless scenarios. Everything from owning a credit card 
to using an Internet service involves promises about how information 
will be collected, shared, and used. Increasingly, individuals make 
important choices on the basis of information furnished by third-
parties involving promises, implied or explicit, that the information is 
accurate, unbiased, and truthful. 
Scholars have long paid less attention to that other side of the 
commercial speech equation,24 what this Article has been calling 
“commoditized speech.” For a long period, such speech was not 
thought to warrant First Amendment attention at all. As Burt 
Neuborne once explained, there was “a structural divide in first 
amendment theory” that “provided effective protection to speech 
 
 20. For an extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases involving commoditized speech 
and how the Court has decided them, see Part III, infra. 
 21. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 791–92 
(1985) (explaining that the Court has “been extremely chary about extending the ‘commercial 
speech’ doctrine beyond this narrowly circumscribed category of advertising”). 
 22. For a discussion of examples involving speech-restrictions in employment contracts 
see Section III.A, infra. 
 23. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1652 (2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1212–16 (lamenting the lack of attention to “the 
commercial speech that has been beneath the protection of the first amendment for all these 
years [that] has not been confined to commercial advertising”). 
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about religion, politics, science, and art, but no protection at all to 
speech about consumer affairs, labor relations, or capital formation.”25 
That divide—what Frederick Schauer calls “boundary disputes” about 
whether the First Amendment applies to a particular restriction on 
speech—have been largely “invisible.”26 As Schauer has explained, 
there has been “[l]ittle case law and not much more commentary” 
pertaining to “why the content-based restrictions of speech in the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor 
Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, [and] the law of fraud” 
(among others) do not raise First Amendment questions.27 
Literature devoted to the question of how the First Amendment 
interacts with commoditized speech remains scattered and 
underdeveloped. Many scholars have grappled with the question in 
one fashion or another, but their efforts have only scratched the 
surface. Their explanations have been incomplete, or their normative 
prescriptions have called for radical shifts in existing doctrine, or 
required the application of vague standards that offer little concrete 
guidance. The following brief survey of the literature shows that the 
area remains understudied and undertheorized. 
In an important Article on this topic in the early 1980s, Steven 
Shiffrin argued that the speech that gets itself involved in commerce 
cannot be readily classified as protected or unprotected by easy 
recourse to its status as commoditized speech because the category 
designation is too broad.28 Some people buy and sell speech precisely 
because of its cultural and political importance, which might render 
even neutral, generally applicable economic regulations suspect in 
some cases.29 Shiffrin suggests that hard cases might involve 
commercial advertising that is critical of the government or that 
advocates for the interests of corporations as social institutions; union 
speech that addresses the fair distribution of power between workers 
 
 25. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital 
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989). 
 26. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1768. 
 27. Id. at 1768. 
 28. See Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1254–55. 
 29. See id. at 1283 (“Speech interacts with the rest of our reality in too many complicated 
ways to allow the hope or the expectation that a single vision or a single theory could explain, 
or dictate helpful conclusions in, the vast terrain of speech regulation. In trying to move toward 
general theory, scholars have too often built abstractions without sufficient regard for the diverse 
contexts in which speech regulation exists.”). 
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and their employers; or a corporate proxy that recommends 
divestment from unjust regimes or suggests that the company cannot 
be run by a Republican board of directors.30 Shiffrin contends that 
many would regard it unacceptable for the government to regulate 
those sorts of messages, even pursuant to neutral, generally applicable 
laws against misleading, false, or fraudulent speech.31 Shiffrin’s 
broader point is that speech in any abstract category can warrant 
First Amendment protection because its content can make 
censorship indistinguishable from the kinds of censorship that 
are clearly unacceptable.32 
Shiffrin’s argument is provocative, but it reflects a particular 
conception of the role and purpose of the First Amendment. Namely, 
he reasons that because particular applications of otherwise acceptable 
prohibitions can lead to unsavory censorship, a better way of applying 
the First Amendment is to pierce those rules when they have 
objectionable consequences.33 For example, in Shiffrin’s view, “the 
SEC’s regulation of statements by corporate executives about a 
corporation’s future” might warrant First Amendment protection—
even if placing restrictions on such statements is helpful for preventing 
harm to investors—because such statements can be “of political 
importance.”34 That is a valid way to view how the First Amendment 
should apply, but it is not the only way and it is inconsistent with how 
the Court has conceptualized the Amendment.  
Shiffrin’s understanding makes any law subject to searching First 
Amendment scrutiny if the law, in one of its incidental applications, 
imposes particularly unappealing censorship.35 This position is not 
without warrant and, after United States v. O’Brien, it is—at least 
formally—the law.36 But the Court has more often said that it can 
 
 30. See id. at 1231–32, 1242. 
 31. See id. at 1231–32 (“Even if one assumes that corporate elections are generally non-
political, the spectacle of the SEC editing proxy materials on the basis of what is true or false on 
matters of domestic and foreign policy should at least cause first amendment eyebrows to lift.”). 
 32. See id. at 1256–82 (“[L]urking throughout first amendment doctrine are 
renunciations of the equal value principle, and difficult compromises. What is important is that 
the courts should be forced to face up to the significance of the compromises that they make. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the compromises, while theoretically 
significant, have been small compromises.”). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. at 1265–68. 
 35. See id. at 1251–54. 
 36. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
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almost automatically reject First Amendment claims, even claims 
involving issues of paramount First Amendment moment, when, for 
example, a law (1) is facially not concerned with speech,37 or (2) is 
content-neutral, even if the consequences are content-based.38 
The counterargument to Shiffrin’s contentions against category-
wide exemptions is thus simply this: all rules are occasionally over- and 
under-inclusive, because that is the nature of rules. But permitting 
exceptions that transform rules into standards can so undermine their 
purposes as to render them worthless. Treating certain regulations of 
commoditized speech as categorically exempt from First Amendment 
scrutiny may be necessary to make welfare-enhancing regulation of 
the category possible at all. 
Frederick Schauer, eschewing efforts to build a grand theory, has 
analyzed the regulation of commoditized speech from what one might 
call a sociological perspective.39 That is, Schauer’s concern is not 
whether commoditized speech should be subject to First Amendment 
protection, but why it is not.40 Schauer contends that commoditized 
speech cases, like other cases at the “boundar[y]” of First Amendment 
protection, cannot be explained by recourse to general principles.41 
Building on the work of Kent Greenawalt, Schauer instead offers an 
array of nondoctrinal “factors” that seem to function as “indicia of 
coverage.”42 Such factors include whether the speech (1) is “public 
rather than face-to-face,” (2) is motivated by “desire for social change 
rather than for private gain,” (3) “relates to something general rather 
than to a specific transaction,” and (4) is “normative rather than 
 
Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16 (noting the conflict between O’Brien and RAV v. City of St. Paul); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2001) (criticizing 
O’Brien for permitting such claims). 
 37. That is the dictum of, among other cases, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
389 (1992) (explaining that “since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not 
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the 
enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable 
class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct 
rather than speech.”). 
 38. That is the holding of, among other cases, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2520 (2014) (“[A] facially neutral law does not become content based . . . simply because it may 
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”). 
 39. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1787–88. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1786–87. 
 42. Id. at 1800–07. 
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informational in content.”43 Schauer further suggests that coverage is 
influenced by (5) “the existence of a sympathetic litigant or class of 
litigants,” (6) the “existence of a link with currently covered First 
Amendment items or domains,” and (7) “the presence or absence of 
an existing and well-entrenched regulatory scheme.”44 
Schauer’s indicia are useful, especially because they show that the 
Court’s doctrinal statements are not as strong a predictor of outcomes 
as the Court’s internal motivations. However, Schauer’s indicia also 
suggest a pattern in the outcomes of the Court’s cases that can be 
knitted together by a broader principle. Namely, many of Schauer’s 
non-doctrinal indicia of First Amendment coverage neatly align with 
the bargain fairness model this Article proposes. His indicia of what 
kinds of speech generally fall outside First Amendment protection are 
precisely the kinds of speech that are most often regulated because of 
their commoditized nature rather than other purposes. In this sense, 
Schauer has usefully identified a correlation between highly 
commodity-like speech and lax First Amendment scrutiny; this Article 
explains why that correlation exists. 
Eugene Volokh has more recently suggested that the permissible 
boundaries of commoditized speech regulation are in fact 
exceptionally narrow.45 In a larger article about why the government 
may not broadly legislate informational privacy rules, Volokh asserts 
that there is only “one sort of limited information privacy law—
contract law applied to promises not to reveal information—[that] is 
eminently defensible under existing free speech doctrine.”46 Volokh 
takes the position that the government can create privacy-protective 
contract default rules, but may not make those privacy-
protections unwaivable.47 
Volokh’s effort is grounded in doctrine, namely, the textbook case 
of Cohen v. Cowles Media, which held that a promissory estoppel action 
may be brought against a newspaper to enforce a promise not to reveal 
a source’s identity.48 But Volokh does not root his defense of 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1061–
62 (2000). 
 46. Id. at 1057. 
 47. Id. at 1061–62. 
 48. See id. at 1057–62. 
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contractual privacy defaults in a deeper normative theory of the First 
Amendment, nor square it with the considerable body of doctrine that 
permits the government to create basically unwaivable contractual 
provisions not to speak. As Schauer explained, “[l]iability for 
misleading instructions, maps, and formulas, for example, is generally 
(and silently) understood not to raise First Amendment issues.”49 
Similarly, prohibitions on workplace sexual harassment are not treated 
as raising First Amendment concerns.50 Thus, even as Volokh admits 
there is a broad sphere of permissible regulation without First 
Amendment review—regulation by contract default-rule—he does 
not engage in a comprehensive review of the doctrine or the theory 
supporting even stronger regulation. 
Daniel Solove and Neil Richards have provided the most recent 
thorough analysis of the First Amendment’s place in the regulation of 
commoditized speech.51 Solove and Richards are concerned not only 
with transactional relationships, but also with the category of remedies 
that the legal system makes available to individuals for privately-
inflicted speech harms (a category into which transactional 
relationships happen to fall).52 They offer a grand theory of the 
appropriate role of the Court in policing such “civil” remedies: “that 
the First Amendment should apply to civil liability when government 
power shapes the content of public discourse, but not when 
government power merely serves as a backstop to private ordering.”53 
Solove and Richards come closest to proposing a theory that 
reflects the bargain fairness model. If by “backstop to private 
ordering” they mean those regulations concerned with enhancing 
bargain fairness (a common form of market regulation), Solove and 
Richards’ test would perfectly match the model suggested here. But 
what Solove and Richards mean by “backstop to private ordering” is 
both broader and narrower than the bargain fairness test. Solove and 
 
 49. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1802. 
 50. See Fallon, supra note 36, at 1–2; see also Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech 
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1793–98 (1992) (arguing that workplace 
sexual harassment should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
 51. Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1651–54. 
 52. Solove and Richards are concerned with “civil” remedies—which involve all suits 
between private individuals, whether the individuals involved in the suits are strangers or 
associates or are suing in tort or contract. Because suits between private parties involved in 
consensual relationships are civil suits that give rise to civil remedies, they are a “subset” of the 
types of relationships to which Solove and Richards are interested. 
 53. Id. at 1655. 
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Richards explain that a law “shapes the content of public discourse” 
(and therefore is not merely a “backstop to private ordering”) when 
“(1) the government defines the content of the civil duty; and (2) the 
speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty, or the government exercises 
undue power in procuring the speaker’s acceptance.”54 This test is thus 
broader than the bargain fairness test because it would permit the 
government to regulate with any interest in mind, and not merely to 
protect the interests of one of the parties to a bargain. Solove and 
Richards’ test is also narrower than the bargain fairness test because it 
would prevent the government from creating unwaivable rules that 
favor less powerful parties even though such rules are often found to 
be, and should be, permissible when they promote bargain fairness. 
Putting aside other ambiguities and complexities in Solove and 
Richards’ test, their suggestion, in line with Volokh,55 that the 
question should be whether the government imposes a duty that 
individuals can avoid,56 is inconsistent with much existing First 
Amendment doctrine (e.g., mandatory information privacy laws, 
limits on harassing workplace speech, and limits on speech by public 
employees). Moreover, it mistakenly focuses on an undertheorized 
conception of individual autonomy at the expense of other values that 
seem to animate decisions in this area (e.g., social welfare, fairness, and 
concern for preserving robust and wide-open public debate). 
This earlier scholarship thus charts a path forward, but remains 
incomplete. Some scholars fail to fully appreciate that the Supreme 
Court’s cases permit more extensive regulation of consensual 
relationships than mere regulation by default rules.57 Others believe 
that no general principle can adequately account for the diversity of 
outcomes that appear in the cases.58 But there is a general principle at 
play in the cases, and its gravitational pull is stronger than scholars 
have recognized.59 The regulation of commoditized speech can have 
serious implications for public discourse, but this Article contends that 
judges have accepted those costs as the price of transactional fairness 
when speech is bought and sold. This Article aims to shake up the 
scholarly debate by showing how the cases reflect a coherent and 
 
 54. Id. at 1655, 1692. 
 55. Solove and Richards offer little guidance as to when government duties are sufficiently 
avoidable as to pose no First Amendment problem. 
 56. Id. at 1692–94. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 1655; Volokh, supra note 45, at 1057. 
 58. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 1786–87; Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1251–82. 
 59. For an in-depth discussion of the cases, see Part III, infra. 
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normatively acceptable approach to the regulation of 
commoditized speech. 
III. BARGAIN FAIRNESS AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
This Part will establish that the holdings of many cases from across 
First Amendment law can be best understood and justified through 
the principle of bargain fairness. In other words, across multiple 
doctrinal areas, the cases converge on a simple idea: that individuals 
should be freely able to enter into speech-regulating relationships and 
to purchase speech commodities, but that government regulations 
that make those bargains fairer are entitled to deference—even 
if  the  duties are unwaivable, are content-based, or result in 
significant censorship. 
This Part analyzes several areas of First Amendment law beginning 
with private and government contracts to show how concern for social 
welfare and bargain fairness guides the Court’s decisions. It then 
addresses cases involving restrictions on the making and purchasing of 
speech commodities and explains why the Court emphatically strikes 
down such restrictions when enhancing bargain-fairness is not their 
purpose or effect. Next, it moves quickly through transactional 
relationships, monopoly relationships, and workplace relationships to 
further establish bargain fairness’s trans-substantive application. 
Finally, it considers cases where there is considerable judicial and 
scholarly disagreement about what the right outcomes should be, and 
explains that the disputes center on how to measure fairness. 
A. The Private Contract Baseline 
Contract law provides a useful baseline for the bargain fairness 
framework, both because of its outsized role in regulating speech in 
society, and because contract is the one area of speech regulation 
where there is general scholarly and judicial agreement about the First 
Amendment’s scope.60 Everyone agrees you can sell your right to 
speak.61 Both scholars with the most expansive libertarian conceptions 
 
 60. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 437–38 nn.305–06 (1999); Mark A. 
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 
DUKE L.J. 147, 230 (1998); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1881–82 (2013). 
 61. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
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of the First Amendment and those who understand the Amendment’s 
contours to be much narrower treat contract as a presumptively valid 
means of selectively restricting and restraining speech.62 
The broad-based agreement that contracts impose permissible 
limitations on speech derives in part from doctrine. A half-century 
ago, the Supreme Court saw no First Amendment problem with 
enforcing a union contract that would have otherwise been a textbook 
First Amendment violation. In Black v. Cutter Laboratories, the 
Supreme Court dismissed a wrongful termination case brought by an 
employee fired for her membership in the Communist Party as 
presenting “no substantial federal question.”63 The Court determined 
that the California courts had interpreted the employment contract’s 
“just cause” termination provision to permit the firing.64 The Supreme 
Court thus dismissed the case because the decision rested on an 
independent and adequate state law ground—California contract 
law.65 Justices Douglas, Warren, and Black thought failing to invalidate 
such a contract “sanction[ed] a flagrant violation of the First 
Amendment.”66 The Court did not.67 Almost a half century later, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that doctrine in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
the modern case that is now most frequently cited for the proposition 
that private contracts do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny.68 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 (1998) (“[P]arties are generally free . . . to commit to being silent 
about almost anything.”). 
 62. Volokh, supra note 45, at 1051 (“While privacy protection secured by contract is 
constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing 
free speech law.”); Solove, supra note 60, at 1880–82, 1894–1900. In fairness, there are a few 
scholars who have argued for the import of First Amendment norms into, for example, the 
private workplace, but courts have resolutely refrained from acting. See Julian N. Eule & 
Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish 
There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1998). 
 63. 351 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1956). 
 64. Id. at 298–99. In passing on the plausibility of the California Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the provision, which permitted termination for “just cause,” the Cutter Court 
noted that the contract had been expressly amended to permit firings on the basis of an 
individual’s political beliefs. Id. 
 65. Id. at 299. 
 66. Id. at 304 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We sanction a flagrant violation of the First 
Amendment when we allow California, acting through her highest court, to sustain Mrs. 
Walker’s discharge because of her belief.”). 
 67. Id. at 298–99. 
 68. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 45, at 1057 (“The Supreme Court explicitly held in 
Cohen v. Cowles Media that contracts not to speak are enforceable with no First 
Amendment  problems.”). 
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The doctrine on this question is watertight. In the employment 
context, there does not appear to be a single speech-related 
termination decision that has been held unenforceable on First 
Amendment grounds, even where the decision was clearly unrelated 
to the job and was motivated by ideological animus. As Charles Glick 
explained in a Note in the Yale Law Journal, decrying that apparent 
insensitivity to First Amendment norms: 
Expressive activities leading to . . . reprisals [by employers] have 
included advocating Communism, advocating homosexuality, filing 
grievances charging wrongdoing by superiors, writing letters critical 
of management to newspapers or government agencies, publishing 
an “underground” company newsletter, voicing misgivings about 
product safety, announcing intentions of attending law school at 
night, writing a novel, counseling a fellow employee of her legal 
rights against the employer, criticizing a superior, implying a racial 
bias on the part of the employer, and advocating women’s rights.69 
None of those reprisals were found to transgress the First 
Amendment because they were authorized by the employees’ 
employment contracts.70 Without implicating the First Amendment, 
employers have similarly maintained policies barring employees from 
speaking about “objectionable or inflammatory” topics off the job, 
engaging in adultery, smoking, and purchasing and using competitors’ 
products.71 Contracts requiring that secrets be kept are also among the 
most common and most important agreements individuals enter.72 
They are as enforceable as other contracts,73 and few have ever been 
subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.74 
 
 69. Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 
526–27 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-
Duty Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 140–42 (2008). 
 72. Garfield, supra note 61, at 269–74. 
 73. See, e.g., United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 942–43 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that a settlement restricting disparaging advertising about the other party’s 
product did not implicate the First Amendment); Wilco Elec. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 543 A.2d 1202, 
1204–05 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that a restrictive covenant giving one party the exclusive 
right to provide television services to residents of a particular development did not implicate the 
First Amendment); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995) (discussing general enforceable of contracts protecting trade secrets). 
 74. For one counterexample in which a court did apply First Amendment scrutiny, see 
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1295–96 (D. Minn. 1990) aff’d and 
remanded, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). The case was affirmed on alternate grounds, limiting 
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The widespread consensus that contract falls outside of the ambit 
of the First Amendment is not simply a product of unquestioning 
adherence to outdated doctrine. Mere convention could not sustain 
such widespread consensus—particularly in an area of doctrine as 
fragmented and complex as the First Amendment. Rather, the 
agreement that contract is outside the First Amendment reflects 
essential, albeit unspoken, assumptions about the importance of 
autonomy and the role of contract in society.75 
Many scholars and courts reason that because the right to speak is 
an incident of individual autonomy, people can sell it.76 As attractive 
as respect for individual autonomy may seem as a justification for 
permitting individuals to sell their right to speak, social welfare—not 
autonomy—is probably the primary reason that courts permit the 
practice.77 If contracts involving speech were unenforceable, many 
 
the state action holding to the opinion of the district court. Even in situations involving contracts 
with the government, which, as the next section details, are ordinarily subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny, many courts have held that First Amendment rights may be waived, as 
long as the waiver is in a freely negotiated contract. See, e.g., Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. Erie, 853 
F.2d 1084, 1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “we know of no doctrine, and [the plaintiff] 
has directed us to no case law, providing a per se rule that constitutional claims, even first 
amendment claims, may not be waived” by agreement); see also Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire 
Dept., Inc. v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding valid contractual waiver 
of first amendment rights), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1106 (1999); Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 
889–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 
1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1991). 
 75. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 60, at 437–38 & nn.305–06 (explaining that respect for 
autonomy grounds the Cohen rule); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1281 (1998) (explaining that voluntariness is the foundation of the 
Cohen rule); Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1690 (acknowledging that “consent is a key 
component” of contract enforceability even if not “the governing concept”); Volokh, supra note 
45, at 1057, 1061 (explaining the Cohen rule is about permitting individuals to alienate the right 
to speak). 
 76. There is no a priori reason, however, that application of the First Amendment should 
turn on whether an individual has volunteered to permit the state to censor him via a contract. 
Many rights cannot be sold because we do not believe it is proper to elevate respect for a person’s 
autonomy over his power to exercise the right at a later time. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865–67 (1987). One cannot sell his vote, for 
example. Id. at 1868. He cannot “sell himself into slavery . . . take undue risks of becoming 
penniless, or . . . sell a kidney.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–12 
(1972). Speech is in many ways precisely the kind of right that would be justifiably inalienable. 
See id.; see also Radin, supra, at 1863–70. The external costs of permitting its alienation “do not 
lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary.” 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111–12. 
 77. The term “social welfare” as it is used here means the overall collective well-being of 
individuals in society. “Specifically, social welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of 
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socially beneficial transactions would not take place because 
individuals would have no means of enforcement. Once the Court 
decided that speech could be bought and sold in the interests of social 
welfare, it sowed the seeds of bargain fairness. Like all other bargains, 
bargains involving speech raise content-based concerns that 
individuals will harm themselves “through their own ill-considered or 
disadvantageous promises.”78 In other words, the very rationale for 
permitting contracts involving speech—social welfare—invites 
regulation in the interests of social welfare.79 
One need look no further than Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. to see 
that fairness and welfare are primary reasons that the Court exempts 
contracts involving speech from First Amendment scrutiny.80 In 
Cohen, a newspaper broke a promise to a source that it would preserve 
his anonymity because the newspaper believed that the source’s 
identity was itself newsworthy.81 The source sued the newspaper for, 
among other things, breach of a contract created by promissory 
estoppel, a doctrine that permits the State to imply a contract when a 
party relies on the promise of another to his detriment.82 The Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment did not shield the newspaper 
from liability for breaking its promise.83 
Cohen is the textbook example of the Court upholding a speech-
restrictive law on the basis of bargain fairness. The newspaper in Cohen 
was penalized for speaking truthfully on a matter of public concern—
that is, engaging in an activity at the heart of the First Amendment—
because it broke a promise when it did so. And the case is not about 
individual autonomy and freedom to contract. The case, after all, did 
 
individuals’ well-being and to depend on no other factors. It is also generally supposed that each 
individual’s well-being affects social welfare in a symmetric manner, which is to say that the idea 
of social welfare incorporates a basic notion of equal concern for all individuals.” Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 985–86 (2001); see also A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 873 n.6 (1998) (“Social welfare is determined by the well-being of individuals. 
Thus, social welfare generally rises if individuals’ well-being rises, and falls if individuals’ well-
being falls.”). 
 78. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
797 (1983). 
 79. See id. at 763–64 (explaining that many “paternalistic” limitations on the ability of 
parties to bind themselves by contract are founded on concern for an “actor’s own welfare”). 
 80. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 667–71 (1991). 
 81. Id. at 665–67. 
 82. Id. at 666–67. 
 83. Id. at 671. 
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not even involve a bilateral contract, but a promissory estoppel claim.84 
The rationale of the case was that Minnesota’s promissory estoppel 
law was general in application and merely required “those making 
promises to keep them.”85 But notice that obligating a party to follow 
through on its promises is not about the autonomy of the promisor to 
freely enter into a contract alienating his rights. Rather, it is about 
safeguarding the welfare of the promisee who relies on the promise to 
his detriment. The rationale for crafting the contract exception to the 
First Amendment in Cohen was explicitly driven by a concern for 
bargain fairness. 
The Court’s treatment of private contracts lays the groundwork 
for its approach to other market regulations involving commoditized 
speech. Because the primary reason for permitting contracts involving 
commoditized speech is social welfare, concern for welfare guides the 
Court’s approach in other areas as well. 
B. The Government Contract Ceiling 
If private contracts form the baseline of commoditized speech 
regulations, contracts with the government form the ceiling. All such 
contracts are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.86 Government 
contracts provide a view on bargain fairness from another vantage 
point. Suits to invalidate conditions in government contracts place the 
value of bargains and First Amendment rights in direct competition. 
Such suits thus reveal how the Court conceptualizes the 
interrelationship of bargaining and speech rights in a particularly 
direct way. The Court’s cases upholding and invalidating contractual 
conditions in government contracts on First Amendment grounds 
demonstrate the same overarching concern for bargain fairness that 
appears in other areas. 
 
 84. Id. at 665. 
 85. Id. at 671. 
 86. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education in 1968, even 
government contracts were thought to be outside the First Amendment’s scope. Before 
Pickering, the law was thought to be reflected Justice Holmes’ famous admonition in McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he 
has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” ergo government contracts do not come within 
the First Amendment’s scope. 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). Pickering established, however, that in 
determining the enforceability of a government contract, the courts have an obligation to weigh 
the government’s interest as an employer against the employee’s interest as a citizen. Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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The traditional scholarly and judicial explanation for the 
distinction between government contracts and other contracts is that 
scrutiny for such contracts is a special case of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.87 Failing to subject government contracts to First 
Amendment scrutiny poses a risk that the government might “strip 
the citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution . . . under 
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege 
the state threatens to withhold.”88 In other words, government 
contracts are a convenient opportunity for the government to engage 
in impermissible censorship, and so the Court watches carefully to 
ensure that the government does not do so. 
The theory that speech restrictions in government employment 
contracts are struck down because they impose unconstitutional 
conditions does not neatly match up with the doctrine the Supreme 
Court has developed in practice.89 The Court has fashioned two 
proxies for determining whether the First Amendment protects a 
government employee’s speech from punishment. First, the Court 
asks whether the speech relates to a matter of public concern.90 
Second, the Court asks whether the speech restriction is related to the 
duties of the job.91 If the speech is about a matter of public concern 
 
 87. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions 
and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 920–22 (2006). 
 88. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926). 
 89. For a general critique, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1476 (1989). 
 90. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (explaining that “the 
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined”); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378, 380–83 (1987); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) 
(explaining that employees’ views expressed privately on publicly important matters are 
protected); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) 
(emphasizing that statements were made in a public forum); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
598 (1972); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. 
 91. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 87, at 941–46 (“[T]he germaneness standard requires 
that any given right be purchased with a limited type of ‘currency’ bearing a logical relationship 
to the right.”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350, 1374 (1984); Renée Lettow Lerner, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
775, 781–82 (2007); Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1456–76 (discussing the centrality of 
germaneness in the unconstitutional conditions cases, and its weaknesses as an explanation of 
what should make a condition unconstitutional). The court has at times treated that as a 
threshold inquiry, and at other times treated it as a factor to be balanced against the importance 
of the speech. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (treating germaneness as 
a threshold inquiry); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (treating germaneness as a factor to 
be balanced). 
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and is not within the scope of the duties of the job, it is protected from 
punishment.92 But it is hard to believe that either the “public concern” 
requirement or the “scope of duties” requirement meaningfully 
accomplishes the task of preventing the government from using its 
status as employer to silence its employees more than it should.93 
These government contracts cases are susceptible to a different 
interpretation, however. Rather than thinking of judicial supervision 
of government contracts as intending to prevent unjustified 
censorship, one might think of such supervision as an effort to ensure 
that bargains between the government and its employees are fair. That 
is, if government employees are to be silenced, the Court watches 
carefully to ensure that they are not required to give up more 
than necessary. 
This reconceptualization convincingly explains both the public 
concern test and the scope-of-employment test. The two tests make a 
great deal of sense if the Court is seeking to determine whether the 
bargain was fair: public concern sifts for the value of the speech, and 
scope-of-duties is used to detect defects in the bargaining process. 
Together, they serve to determine the likelihood that the employee 
willingly parted with her rights and the likelihood that the government 
really needed her to do so. 
The public concern test invoked in the government contract cases 
is best understood as involving a tacit evaluation of the value of 
speaking to the speaker. Hence the odd cases that hold that private 
 
 92. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 151–52 (1983). 
 93. The public concern requirement makes little sense from a rights perspective. If the 
Court’s goal in scrutinizing government contracts were to protect freedom of speech as a right 
to speak, its choice to only protect some speech, but not all, would make little sense. Moreover, 
as applied, the Court has held that even speech expressed in private can constitute speech on a 
matter of public concern. The Court has also held that speech with relatively little substantive 
content and low social value is speech on a matter of public concern in some circumstances, and 
that speech with more content and relatively high social value is not on a matter of public concern 
in other circumstances. Compare Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–83, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–
15. It is also unclear how the scope-of-duties test prevents the government from censoring 
speech it does not like. Surrendering a right germane to the performance of a specific task might 
make the government’s interest more legitimate, but it is still censorship. Moreover, as applied, 
the scope-of-duties test is so broad that almost any restriction can be found to be within the 
scope of an employee’s duties at a high enough level of generality. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–67 (1973). Finally, the scope-of-
duties test has proven a poor method of smoking out pretext. See San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81, 
84–85. 
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comments to a superior,94 the expression of a fleeting opinion about 
the news in the office,95 and comments on local education policy in a 
local newspaper96 are all speech on matters of public concern sufficient 
to preclude adverse employment actions.97 The unifying theme is that 
employees would not have lightly permitted their employers to 
demand that they give up the right to express those opinions.98 
These cases also show that the scope-of-duties test is a method of 
sifting for defects in the bargaining process. The scope-of-duties test, 
as applied, is used to determine whether it is likely that the 
government had a genuine job-related reason for imposing the 
restriction in question. From a bargain fairness perspective, that 
analysis is important because the baseline presumption is that 
employers do not generally require individuals to give up more First 
Amendment freedom than is necessary to perform a given job (since 
they would have to pay their employees more if they did so). The 
scope-of-duties test thus helps the Court determine whether the 
restrictions are actually economically justified, or if, instead, the 
government has used its relative bargaining power to extract an 
unfair concession.99 
The government contracts cases thus reveal more of a narrow 
concern for protecting individuals’ private welfare than a broad 
concern with preventing the government from censoring speech that 
is structurally important to democratic governance. The Court’s goal 
seems to be to ensure that employees who choose to give up their 
right to speak do so on terms that are fair to them, not to prevent the 
government from tampering with the broader marketplace of ideas. 
 
 94. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414. 
 95. Rankin, 483 U.S. at  380–83. 
 96. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 97. The teacher in Pickering who wrote her letter to the editor criticizing the school 
board, the teacher in Givhan who voiced her concerns about racial discrimination in the school 
privately to her principal, and the clerical employee in Rankin who rooted for the President’s 
assassin in a remark to her coworker, each made statements that expressed their personal views 
in circumstances outside their traditional job roles. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–83; Givhan, 
439 U.S. at 414; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 98. In contrast, in cases like Connick v. Myers, where the Court held that an assistant 
district attorney’s questionnaire critical of management was not speech on a matter of public 
concern, the Court might have concluded that speech critical of management was likely to be 
valuable to the government to restrict. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 99. To give an example, if the government tried to require government employees to 
never reveal information acquired on the job, the scope-of-duties test would help the court to 
show why the condition was likely invalid as applied to a custodian but valid as applied to a spy. 
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To be sure, the remedies employed in government contract cases 
do not perfectly align with a bargain fairness approach. In the 
government employment cases, the Court steps in to strike down 
contract terms rather than carefully evaluating whether the employees 
were adequately compensated for them.100 If bargain fairness is truly 
the touchstone, one might reasonably ask why the Court would not 
instead analyze whether the bargain adequately compensated the 
employee for alienating the right to speak. After all, if in principle one 
would be willing to sell her silence to the government for an 
appropriate price, the Court should look to the contract price—in 
addition to the value of the speech and the nature of the job—to 
determine whether the bargain was fair. 
There are two answers to that argument, and both have interesting 
implications beyond the government contracts setting. First, it is 
plausible that the Court does not analyze price because the market 
value of relinquished rights to speech cannot be easily priced. Speech-
restrictive conditions outside the scope of one’s job duties are unlikely 
to be salient to individuals negotiating government contracts, and 
oftentimes will have no private-market analogs, making it difficult to 
find a substitute employment contract against which to price the term. 
As such, the Court may strike out such terms as a second-
best alternative. 
Second, the Court may strike out terms because even if such terms 
could be priced, it would not be administrable to continually 
adjudicate claims that individuals were not paid enough for their 
silence. Striking out terms sets the conditions for all negotiations 
between the government and its employees, thus preventing strategic 
behavior by both parties when dickering over terms. Making 
government speech restrictions waivable, even in principle, might be 
so likely to be abused that the Court thinks it better to take such terms 
off the table. 
Those two problems—difficulty pricing terms and difficulty 
policing negotiations—reappear in other areas involving 
commoditized speech. Where a government regulation simulates a 
contract term for which people would negotiate but is difficult to price 
and police, the Court has generally deferred when the government 
makes the term unwaivable. 
 
 100. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–80 (1995) 
(invalidating law banning honoraria for certain executive branch employees). 
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C. Unconstitutional Commoditized Speech Restrictions 
The Court’s cases striking down regulations involving 
commoditized speech also reveal the power of the fair bargain 
conception by negative inference. In numerous instances, commercial 
regulations that are not confined to the amelioration of bargain 
inequalities are struck down.101 Thus, even as bargain fairness can make 
it seem as if the Court is unduly lax in its analysis of the regulation of 
commoditized speech, these cases stand as a reminder of the limited 
scope and application of the bargain fairness test. 
 
 101. Some examples demonstrate the breadth of this principle. In the charitable solicitation 
context, the Supreme Court has at least thrice struck down rules that would limit consensual 
donations to some types of charities by limiting the amount that charities could spend on 
fundraising. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 619–21 
(2003) (explaining that in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988), 
Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), and Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), “the Court 
invalidated laws that prohibited charitable organizations or fundraisers from engaging in 
charitable solicitation if they spent high percentages of donated funds on fundraising—whether 
or not any fraudulent representations were made to potential donors” because such laws are not 
narrowly tailored to combat fraud). In the context of licensing schemes governing the 
distribution of commoditized speech, the Supreme Court has invalidated laws empowering 
officials to grant (or deny) permission to distribute leaflets and erect newsracks on public 
property where the schemes were not narrowly tailored to protect public welfare. See City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769–72 (1988) (newsracks); Lovell v. City 
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1938) (leaflets). The Supreme Court has also struck down 
prohibitions on the distribution of anonymous election-related leaflets—justified by the need to 
better inform voters about the source of campaign-related messages and prevent fraud—finding 
the better-inform-voters rationale insufficient because anonymity is part of the message, and 
finding the anti-fraud rationale insufficient because the law was overbroad and other antifraud 
statutes already adequately guarded against fraud. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995). The Supreme Court has struck down right-of-reply laws—laws that 
permit politicians criticized by newspapers to respond on the pages of the same newspaper. Those 
laws, although justified as giving consumers greater access to information they may want, have 
been invalidated at least in part on the grounds that permitting a right-of-reply fundamentally 
alters the product being sold. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974) 
(invalidating newspaper right-of-reply statute); cf. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 116–21 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding broadcasters had right to refuse to sell 
advertising time to political advertisers). The Supreme Court has also said, in dictum, that there 
can be no legitimate “state interest in suppressing [the dissemination of books] . . . out of 
solicitude for the sensibilities of readers.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 55 (1988) (holding that outrageousness of the speech to some readers did not alter its 
protected status); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (explaining in dictum 
that Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be barred from engaging in door-to-door soliciting merely 
because those views are “unpopular, annoying or distasteful” to some). 
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Two recent cases provide ready examples. Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc. and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association both involved 
government regulation of commercial transactions in which speech 
commodities were sold. In each case the Court applied strict scrutiny 
and struck down the regulations.102 Each case involved regulation of 
commoditized speech that did not seek to enhance the fairness of the 
bargain between the parties to the transaction. The two cases thus 
support the general thesis by negative implication: when 
commoditized speech regulations do not seek to make a transaction 
fairer to one of the parties to that transaction, but instead have other 
purposes, the Court will strike them down. 
In the first case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court 
struck down a Vermont privacy law that prohibited the sale, disclosure 
for marketing purposes, or use for marketing purposes of pharmacy 
records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors.103 
The Court treated the law as a content-based and speaker-based 
restriction on speech, applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated it.104 
Lacking a better vocabulary for formulating their defense of the law, 
Vermont tried to argue that the restrictions at issue should have been 
subjected to more lenient scrutiny because the speech at issue was 
“commercial speech.”105 The Court held that even analyzed under the 
more forgiving standards applicable to commercial speech, Vermont’s 
law was unconstitutional.106 
In the second case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the 
Supreme Court struck down a California law that prohibited the sale 
or rental of violent videogames to minors and required packaging 
labels for such products to state “18.”107 Like Vermont in Sorrell, 
California lacked a ready vocabulary for arguing its case, but tried to 
argue that the restrictions were permissible because violent speech is 
like obscenity and unprotected by the First Amendment.108 The Court 
held that violent speech was entitled to full constitutional protection, 
 
 102. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011). 
 103. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552, 556–57. 
 104. Id. at 565–67. 
 105. Id. at 571. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Brown, 564 U.S. at 789. 
 108. Id. at 792–93. 
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determined that California’s law imposed a content-based restriction, 
applied strict scrutiny, and invalidated the law.109 
The two cases look like straightforward applications of the content 
principle and settled First Amendment norms. Neither was, however. 
Both cases divided the court. Sorrell was 6–3,110 and Brown was 7–2 
with a two-justice concurrence.111 Both cases masked deeper issues. In 
Sorrell, the deeper issue was the extent to which the government may 
protect a third-party’s interests (such as those of patients and doctors) 
by interfering with otherwise consensual commercial transactions 
between other parties (pharmacies and marketers). In Brown, the 
deeper issue was the extent to which the government may interfere 
with commercial transactions between two otherwise consenting 
parties (children and videogame retailers).  
Both cases clearly involve the regulation of commoditized speech 
and paternalistic rather than more nefariously censorial government 
motives. And in both cases, the laws at issue were found to violate the 
First Amendment. These cases show that there is a range of 
circumstances where the Court will intervene to strike down 
regulations governing bargains over commoditized speech when those 
regulations venture beyond ensuring bargain fairness. The crucial fact 
about each case is that no party to the bargains wanted the transaction 
to include the mandatory government term. In Brown, neither the 
retailers nor the children wanted the transaction restricted.112 In 
Sorrell, neither the pharmacies nor the marketers wanted it.113 The 
regulations thus did not make the bargains fairer. They did not seek 
to fill in a term that the less powerful party would have wanted had 
the circumstances of bargaining been more equal. The Court struck 
down the regulations in both cases because the laws at issue did not 
seek to make a transaction fairer to one of the parties to that 
transaction, but instead had other purposes. 
 
 109. Id. at 798–804. 
 110. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 555. 
 111. Brown, 564 U.S. at 787. 
 112. In Brown the restriction completely barred willing children from purchasing violent 
videogames from willing retailers. There was no question that some children wished to purchase 
the games on their own. See, e.g., id. at 794–95, 802–04 (discussing the law’s restrictions on 
purchase even by children of parents who do not disapprove of the purchase). 
 113. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The statute prevents 
willing sellers and willing buyers from completing a sale of information to be used for purposes 
that the state disapproves.”), aff’d, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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Take Sorrell: the Vermont law at issue made it unlawful for 
pharmacies and marketers to engage in a consensual transaction.114 
The law’s intent was not to protect the fairness of the bargain between 
the pharmacies and advertisers.115 Rather the statute imposed that bar 
to protect the interests of third parties (patients, doctors, and the 
general public).116 The State contended that the law was “necessary to 
protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality, avoidance 
of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship” 
and was integral “to . . . improved public health and reduced 
healthcare costs.”117 The regulation in Sorrell thus prohibited an 
otherwise consensual speech contract between A and B, in order to 
protect the interests of C, D, and E. The Court rejected all of 
Vermont’s proffered interests as insufficient to support the law even 
under the relatively deferential standard afforded to commercial 
speech.118 Cryptically, near the end of the opinion, the Court noted 
that its cases recognize that the government has a “legitimate interest 
in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms,’” but that Vermont 
had not advanced a justification addressing harms of that type.119 
Similarly, in Brown, the California law prohibited the sale of 
violent videogames to children on the grounds that children are 
especially vulnerable to the effects of violent speech.120 California did 
not seek to hide this justification for the law. On the contrary, 
California’s whole case was that the speech was unprotected (of low 
value because it is immoral) and that children could be legitimately 
prohibited from accessing it (because they are particularly vulnerable 
to its corrupting influence).121 California’s only other justification for 
the law was that the law would help vindicate the third-party interests 
of parents who wished to protect their children from video game 
violence.122 The Court rejected all of those justifications as not 
presenting a compelling government interest sufficient to survive 
strict scrutiny.123 
 
 114. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558–59 (describing the law at issue). 
 115. See id. at 571–79 (describing Vermont’s asserted interests in enacting the law). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572. 
 118. Id. at 572–79. 
 119. Id. at 579. 
 120. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798–800 (2011).  
 121. Id. at 793–96, 800. 
 122. Id. at 801–04. 
 123. See id. at 794–96, 799–804. 
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Suppose the facts of the two cases were modified slightly such that 
the regulations were designed to enhance bargain fairness. It is 
probable that the cases would have come out differently. Suppose, on 
the one hand, that in Brown the software at issue were an automated 
stock-trading program, and the requirement was a warning on the box 
that the program’s trading algorithm had not been proven to actually 
make any money. Those facts would make the case like Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli, a case in which the Second 
Circuit held that the marketing, sale, and use of a stock trading 
program was subject to the registration and antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws and not protected by the First Amendment.124 Unlike 
the restrictions in Brown, the registration and antifraud laws upheld in 
Vartuli exist to enhance bargain fairness by providing investors with 
information they would surely want.  
Suppose, on the other hand, that in Sorrell the prohibition had 
“allow[ed] the [prescriber-identifying] information’s sale or disclosure 
in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances.”125 There is 
language in Sorrell that suggests that such a restriction would have 
been constitutional because it would have shown that the “State’s 
asserted interest in physician confidentiality” was actual, rather than 
pre-textual.126 Rather than an apparent concern with preventing the 
commercial marketing of prescription drugs, that justification—
protecting physician confidentiality—would have reflected a concern 
for the fairness of the bargain between pharmacies and physicians. The 
Court in Sorrell suggested that such a law would have 
been constitutional.127 
Thus, Sorrell and Brown, as evaluated under the lens of the fair-
bargain conception of First Amendment law, tend to show that 
commoditized speech regulations that do something other than 
attempt to protect one of the parties to a transaction are subject to 
intensive First Amendment scrutiny, even while fairness-promoting 
regulations rarely receive scrutiny at all.  
 
 124. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 107–13 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
 125. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 554 (2011).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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D. Commoditized Speech in Transactional Relationships 
Bargain fairness also prominently appears in cases involving the 
regulation of ongoing transactional relationships. Those cases fall 
outside the narrow ambit of commercial speech, because they do not 
strictly involve advertising or proposals to engage in a market 
transaction. Rather, they involve a relationship of relative trust 
between market participants. For example, in the securities realm, First 
Amendment cases would involve the requirement that companies 
make continuously available to market participants truthful, non-
misleading information about their operations and performance.128 In 
the professional services realm, regulations require that advisors, 
counselors, attorneys, and doctors provide information, advice, and 
guidance that comply with certain minimal standards of professional 
and ethical conduct.129 
The Supreme Court has permitted substantial content-based 
regulation in those transactional settings to combat fraud and, more 
broadly, to combat a lack of adequate bargain-relevant information for 
consumers.130 Each of those concerns is manifestly about bargain 
 
 128. The “core mechanism” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is “sweeping 
disclosure requirements” that allow “shareholder choice.” Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 
U.S. 1, 12 (1985); see also Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 682 (4th Cir. 
1999); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1987). But there have been 
very few First Amendment challenges to those disclosure requirements. In Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Association, the Court stated in dictum that “[n]umerous examples could be cited of 
communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment,” including “the 
exchange of information about securities [and] corporate proxy statements.” 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978) (citations omitted). The Court noted that “[e]ach of these examples illustrates that the 
State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public 
whenever speech is a component of that activity.” Id. 
 In the distant past, at least one federal appellate court summarily rejected a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the regulation of corporate proxy materials. See SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 
123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that petitioners’ claims that proxy regulations “are 
unconstitutional as unauthorized delegations of legislative power and otherwise . . . have no 
merit” (emphasis added)). 
 129. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1183, 1205–09 & nn.105–07 (2016) (explaining fiduciary duties of doctors, lawyers, 
and accountants). 
 130. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“When a State 
regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive 
sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its 
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial 
speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the 
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the 
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous 
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equity. Further, regulation in these circumstances is content-based in 
the most classic sense: it distinguishes between speech on the basis of 
its content and between speakers on the basis of their identities.131 The 
Court makes such distinctions because the risk of fraud is greater in 
some commercial contexts than others.132 
For example, most compelled commercial disclosures are subject 
to reduced First Amendment scrutiny and are now subject to a 
standard of review bordering on rational basis.133 In settings where the 
underlying transactions are complex or individuals stand in a 
relationship of vulnerability to professionals with specialized 
knowledge, the scope of permissible antifraud and information 
disclosure measures has been even more sweeping.134 The government 
has been permitted to impose much more substantial antifraud and 
information-forcing regulations on individuals who work as securities 
professionals, accountants, and lawyers, for example, than almost 
anyone else.135 
 
review that the First Amendment generally demands.”); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (“The States and the Federal Government are free to 
prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.”); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) 
(“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do 
not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (defining content-
based laws as “those that target speech based on its communicative content” by, for example, 
“defining regulated speech by particular subject matter” or “its function or purpose”). 
 132. For example, the regulations will only apply to lawyers, accountants, or investment 
advisers. Or, they will relate to certain types of information or classes of transaction, such as 
selling a security, purchasing a house, or hiring an attorney. See also Schauer, supra note 2, at 
1778 (“It might be hyperbole to describe the Securities and Exchange Commission as the 
Content Regulation Commission, but such a description would not be wholly inaccurate.”). 
 133. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); Zaud-
erer, 471 U.S. at 657–58; Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); 
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012); Borgner v. 
Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2002); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294 (1st 
Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 134. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 93, 95; see also Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1238, 1258–64 (2016) (describing doctrine). 
 135. Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 
223, 223 (1990); Neuborne, supra note 25, at 5–6; see Schauer, supra note 2, at 1766–67, 
1778, 1781–84. See generally Henry N. Butler, The First Amendment and Federal Securities 
Regulation, 20 CONN. L. REV. 261 (1988). 
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What restrictions on misleading speech and disclosure 
requirements have in common is that they are intensely concerned 
with regulating the four corners of the bargain. Each dictates the 
information that must be made available to consumers before 
bargaining even begins. And in the particular settings in which such 
regulations are most pervasive—professional settings involving 
complex transactions or circumstances involving the need for secret-
keeping—the products themselves are almost always commoditized 
speech.136 They are frequently contracts with doctors, lawyers, 
bankers, or accountants, for example, in which an individual is either 
seeking access to specialized information or revealing information of 
a particularly personal and sensitive kind.137 
Commentators have been puzzled for decades by the fact that 
some areas of intensely content-based speech regulation remain 
subject to, at best, modest First Amendment scrutiny.138 But a judicial 
concern for ensuring bargain fairness readily explains the lack of rigor. 
The purpose of the measures in question is to level the bargaining 
positions of the parties, thereby helping individuals to obtain a better 
deal in circumstances of significant information asymmetry. 
Regulations intended to prevent fraud are particularly suitable for 
deference because they are often what make the transaction possible 
at all by reducing the transaction costs associated with the imbalance 
of power between the parties. If bargain fairness is the value guiding 
the Courts’ decisions, it comes as no surprise that the Court has long 
held that common-law antifraud regulation is completely exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny.139 
The Article’s thesis is also consistent with the tight nexus with 
bargains that the Court has treated as essential to the deference a law 
receives. Regulations that wander too far from immediate relevance to 
 
 136. See, e.g., Aman, supra note 134, at 94 (“[A] significant component of the ultimate 
product or commodity produced and sold by many professions is in the form of words—spoken 
or written.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 134, at 1248–54 (explaining that professionals “serve[] 
as the conduit between . . . knowledge communities” and individuals). 
 138. See sources cited supra note 135. 
 139. “Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable 
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may restrict 
speech without affronting the First Amendment.” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2547 (2012); See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections 
of the First Amendment). 
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an underlying transaction raise red flags.140 The Court has explicitly 
acknowledged that the First Amendment does not prevent antifraud 
regulations, for example, but that it does prevent laws against lying 
that have no commercial nexus.141 It has also held that information 
furnished by a credit reporting agency to a limited audience meant to 
aid its subscribers in making business decisions is far less worthy of 
First Amendment protection than speech that concerns a “public 
issue” that was not made “solely in the individual interest of the 
speaker and its specific business audience.”142 
The courts’ commercial speech, securities regulation, and 
professional regulation cases all converge on bargain fairness. Where 
the Court believes that a bargain between a consumer and a firm 
would be made materially fairer by the imposition of a particular 
speech regulation the Court generally defers. Where such regulations 
do not have a close nexus with the bargain or are for other purposes, 
however, they are likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 
E. Speech Restrictions Imposed by Monopolists 
Cases involving monopolies comprise the area where the Court 
has applied something like the bargain fairness conception with the 
greatest consistency. This is logical because conditions of market 
power are the easiest to evaluate from a bargain fairness perspective. 
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a company 
town could not deprive town residents of the right to receive religious 
literature from proselytizers.143 Marsh could be reframed, however, as 
a case about the permissible scope of the government’s power to 
regulate the contractual relationship between the company and its 
residents. Returning to the baseline assumption that individuals are 
unlikely to concede, and companies are unlikely to make individuals 
forgo First Amendment interests that are not within the scope of their 
job duties, one could recast the case as a bargain fairness case. The fact 
that the company town possessed monopoly power drove the Court 
 
 140. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 203–11 (1985) (interpreting the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 as not applying to financial newsletters in order to prevent potential First 
Amendment problems). 
 141. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545–48. 
 142. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761–62 (1985). 
 143. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1946). Specifically, the case involved the 
application of an Alabama trespassing statute to a Jehovah’s Witness, who attempted to distribute 
religious literature on the privately owned sidewalks of a “company town.” 
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to interpose a requirement in the contract between the company and 
its residents that would likely have already been a part of the bargain 
had the town not possessed monopoly power.144 
The Court has also permitted states to impose compulsory terms 
in circumstances where the property owner has at least some market 
power.145 Thus, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme 
Court concluded that a California Supreme Court decision requiring 
that a shopping center permit high school students to exercise their 
state-protected rights of expression and petition on its property did 
not violate the shopping center’s First Amendment rights.146 Because 
a shopping center is often more than a site of commerce but also serves 
as a focal point for conversation and community interaction, and 
because such spaces can have considerable market power in small 
communities, one justification for the result in Pruneyard is that it 
enhances the bargaining power of those who use the shopping center 
to see, hear, and partake in free expression. 
The Court’s other market power decisions have involved 
circumstances that might be described as analogous to preventing 
firms from placing unfairly speech-restrictive terms in their contracts. 
In Associated Press v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
Associated Press’s (AP’s) system of By-Laws, which prevented all AP 
member newspapers from selling news to non-member newspapers, 
violated the antitrust laws.147 The Court further held that newspapers 
were not protected from antitrust scrutiny simply because the 
products they sold were speech commodities.148 In Lorrain Journal 
Co. v. United States, the Court held that a requirement imposed by a 
newspaper with monopoly power that its advertisers not advertise with 
the local radio station similarly violated the antitrust laws and was 
 
 144. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508–09 (“[T]he managers appointed by the corporation 
cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of 
the Constitutional guarantees . . . . Many people in the United States live in company-owned 
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and 
country. . . . There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect 
to any other citizen.”). 
 145. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to extend the Marsh doctrine, likely because of 
its concern with protecting the welfare-enhancing power of individuals to freely enter into 
contracts involving restrictions on speech. 
 146. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77, 88 (1980). 
 147. 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945). 
 148. Id. at 4–5, 7. 
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ineligible for First Amendment protection.149 In Turner Broadcasting 
Systems, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law that 
required cable television systems to dedicate some of their channels to 
local broadcast television stations because cable providers had 
monopoly power and local televisions stations were likely to go out of 
business without the intercession of the law.150 
Framed in fair bargain terms, each of these cases involved a 
situation where the court permitted the regulation of commoditized 
speech on the explicit grounds that one of the parties possessed too 
little power to obtain favorable terms.151 
F. Speech Restrictions in Employment Contexts 
Workplace speech regulation is extensive and also puzzling. It has 
proven to be an endless font of debate among scholars. Beginning 
with labor law more than half a century ago and moving into modern 
workplace harassment law, the Court has permitted the government 
to place significant content-based restrictions on speech in the 
workplace untroubled by the First Amendment.152 Bargain fairness 
explains why. In labor law and modern sexual harassment law, to give 
two examples, the Court permits extensive regulation as part of its 
broader view that regulation of the fairness of economic bargains 
between the parties is permissible. 
1. Labor law 
In labor law, courts have permitted the extensive regulation of the 
speech of employers and unions without applying serious First 
Amendment scrutiny. Labor cases have permitted content-based 
injunctions against picketing,153 and treated even true statements 
about the consequences of unionization as threats constituting an 
 
 149. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951). 
 150. 520 U.S. 180, 185–86, 197–200 (1997). 
 151. And when the cases were close, such as in Turner, it was not because members of the 
court objected to bargain fairness, but rather because they thought bargain fairness was being 
used as a pretext for other aims. See id. at 229–30, 249 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 152. Fallon, supra note 36, at 1 (explaining absence of First Amendment scrutiny for 
workplace sexual harassment laws); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1782 (absence of First Amendment 
scrutiny for labor laws). 
 153. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 285–87, 295 
(1957) (upholding an injunction against picketing); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 
U.S. 490, 491–92, 504 (1949) (same). 
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unfair labor practice.154 As Schauer explained, “much of the balance of 
modern labor law involves unashamedly content-based restrictions on 
boycotts, strikes, and picketing.”155 The result is that “[i]n some 
contexts unions may say and do things that employers may not, and 
in other contexts employers may say and do things that unions may 
not—the two schemes together constituting a complex but content-
based system of government regulation of speech.”156 
The reason for the Court’s relatively permissive First Amendment 
treatment of labor regulations, which seems clear from the cases 
themselves,157 is that unionization is a method of economic 
empowerment for workers that the government may justifiably protect 
through speech regulation. At the same time, unions must be 
restrained to ensure that they do not abuse their position of relative 
market power to extract unfair concessions from employers.158 One 
might reasonably argue from a laissez-faire free marketeer’s 
perspective that labor law, with its regulatory tinkering and counter-
tinkering, represents concern for bargain fairness run amok, resulting 
in substantial restrictions on valuable speech. What has likely driven 
the Court’s refusal to interfere is a belief that the government’s 
purpose in regulating the labor sphere is both benign and permissible, 
designed to ensure that employers and unions strike fair bargains even 
if the consequence is significant content-based restrictions on the 
speech of employers and unions. 
 
 154. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616–20 (1969); Farris Fashions, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 32 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 155. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1783. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See infra note 158. 
 158. See, e.g., Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617 (“And any balancing of those rights must 
take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the 
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications 
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”); Local 695, 354 
U.S. at 285–87, 295 (“The Court therefore concluded that it was ‘clear that appellants were 
doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. . . . They were exercising their 
economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather 
than by state regulation of trade.’”); Giboney, 336 U.S. at 497 (“To exalt all labor union conduct 
in restraint of trade above all state control would greatly reduce the traditional powers of states 
over their domestic economy and might conceivably make it impossible for them to enforce their 
antitrade restraint laws.”). 
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2. Workplace sexual harassment 
Bargain fairness also explains one of the great riddles of modern 
First Amendment law: the complete absence of First Amendment 
scrutiny for workplace sexual harassment regulations. In the area of 
workplace harassment law, courts have not applied First Amendment 
scrutiny,159 even though workplace harassment is almost always a 
product of speech in the workplace.160 The fact that workplace 
harassment law restricts a great deal of speech on the basis of its 
content has been a source of great scholarly concern,161 but has not 
gained similar traction in the courts.162 
Jack Balkin gave one of the best explanations for the courts’ 
decision not to subject harassment in the workplace to First 
Amendment scrutiny: that employees at work are functionally a 
captive audience.163 As Balkin once explained, the “employee working 
for low wages in a tight job market who is sexually harassed by her 
employer or co-worker” is in many ways analogous to the “passengers 
on the public buses who may see advertisements they would rather 
 
 159. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(2)(a)(1) (2000). 
 160. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347, 352 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) 
(“[A] survey of the kinds of events that generate hostile environment claims demonstrates that 
in most of them the hostile environment is created by an environment of insults, jokes, catcalls, 
comments, and other forms of undeniably verbal conduct.”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of 
Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 
691 (1997); Volokh, supra note 50, at 1800–01. 
 161. See Estlund, supra note 160, at 707 (“The range of [scholarly] views on this matter 
spans the full gamut, from those who would permit the regulation of any speech that contributes 
to a hostile environment, including speech on public issues, to those who would permit no 
regulation of speech that would be protected in the public square.”); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual 
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 697–99 (2012) (summarizing disputes); see also Mary 
Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (1996); Eugene Volokh, How 
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995). 
 162. See Fallon, supra note 36, at 1 (summarizing Supreme Court’s quiet rejection of First 
Amendment claims in the landmark Title VII case Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 
(1993)); see also Estlund, supra note 160, at 707 (“The Supreme Court has left few clues to the 
constitutionally permissible scope of workplace harassment law, and the lower courts have largely 
followed the Harris model of silence.”). 
 163. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2312–14 (1999). 
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avoid or the child running through stations on the radio dial.”164 
However, captive audience doctrine is murky, normatively 
controversial, and difficult to apply.165 As Balkin himself has 
acknowledged, whether an individual is viewed as a captive audience 
member depends on contingent societal views about what constitutes 
unjust coercion.166 
Despite its shortcomings, Balkin’s captive audience argument 
provides a compelling account of the absence of First Amendment 
scrutiny for workplace sexual harassment. It also neatly matches up 
with the theory of bargain fairness. Reconceiving harassment law in 
bargain terms, the prohibition on harassment in the workplace might 
be considered a compulsory term meant to reflect an anti-sexual-
harassment term that employees would obtain in a fair bargain. Due 
to its disfavored status in society, harassing speech has relatively low 
value, and permitting harassing speech is rarely germane to the 
requirements of a job. Consequently, if employees and employers were 
to bargain on equal footing over the issue, it is not implausible that 
employers would be willing to accede to an employee’s demand that 
the employee not be subjected to harassment in the workplace. 
Moreover, an important and underappreciated component of 
workplace sexual harassment law is that people cannot prospectively 
waive their rights to be free from harassment in their employment 
contracts.167 The discrimination laws are not mere contractual default 
rules, but rather mandatory non-waivable guarantees made to every 
employee.168 Two possible justifications are that (1) it is probably 
difficult to price such waivers, because it is difficult to know how many 
employees would freely and voluntarily submit to sexual harassment, 
and (2) it is more administrable and transaction cost-effective to apply 
an across-the-board presumption against waiver to all employment 
contracts. Because it is unlikely that any person would like to be 
 
 164. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 424. 
 165. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 160, at 715–18. 
 166. See Balkin, supra note 163, at 2314; Balkin, supra note 164, at 423–24. 
 167. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (explaining that an 
employee cannot prospectively waive her Title VII rights); Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 
581, 594 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“While a release of Title VII claims will not ordinarily violate public policy, an employee may 
validly release only those Title VII claims arising from ‘discriminatory acts or practices which 
antedate the execution of the release.’”); EEOC, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002 (Apr. 10, 1997). 
 168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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sexually harassed, prohibiting sexual harassment likely safeguards the 
vast majority of workers from the possibility that their employer might 
attempt to sneak a waiver provision into their employment contract. 
The fact that rights to freedom from sexual harassment may not 
be waived, moreover, shows that the power of the government to 
regulate commoditized speech is greater than ordinarily assumed. The 
non-waivability of rights against sexual harassment is similar to the 
non-waivability of rights against malpractice and fraud.169 Even though 
fraud and malpractice liability are unwaivable, the Court has not struck 
down those forms of liability as violative of the First Amendment even 
when they result in significant censorship. Thus, contrary to the 
assumptions of scholars like Volokh, Solove, and Richards,170 the 
Court has permitted legislatures to determine that some types of 
waivers are so likely to result in unfair bargains that they may be 
prohibited entirely.  
G. The Contested Field of Tort-Like Harms from Commoditized Speech 
The final field of commoditized speech cases worth canvassing is 
that mysterious region where First Amendment scrutiny has been 
highly unpredictable: tort liability for harms arising from 
commoditized speech. The argument from a fair-bargain standpoint 
is that these cases prove difficult because it is unclear which party to 
the bargain is treated unfairly by the imposition of liability. On the one 
hand, failing to impose liability means that tortious harms fall on 
victims. On the other hand, in many of these circumstances, it seems 
 
 169. See, e.g., Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 390 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that liability for securities fraud is unwaivable under federal and Texas law 
securities laws); Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 58 (2011) (nothing that medical malpractice liability is 
unwaivable); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and 
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 468 (2004) (noting that “public policy 
considerations and codes of professional conduct generally preclude members of [certain 
professions] from attempting to limit their liability for their professional negligence”); see also 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2003) (“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, 
to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or 
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of 
the law.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating 
that a lawyer shall not “make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client 
for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making this agreement”). 
 170. See Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1655 (arguing that government may not 
constitutionally impose unwaivable speech-restrictive civil liability rules); Volokh, supra note 45, 
at 1057 (similar). 
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unlikely that the product would be economical to provide if tort 
liability were available. Moreover, in many cases, it is extremely costly 
to adjudicate tort claims due to concerns about the traceability of the 
harms to the speech commodity. 
In fields where these concerns do not exist, liability for 
commoditized speech is routine and unproblematic. Malpractice is a 
familiar tort that has never been a focus of First Amendment attention. 
Similarly, cases involving technical products that have a defined 
discrete group of customers who use the product solely for its 
informational value also routinely escape First Amendment scrutiny. 
In Brocklesby v. United States, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that 
a publisher of a factually erroneous aeronautical chart could be held 
liable for furnishing a defective product.171 There are similar cases 
finding liability and a lack of First Amendment protection for other 
speech products providing misleading instructions.172 
However, courts have interposed the First Amendment to block 
tort liability in cases in which traceability is difficult to establish and 
the likely uses for commoditized speech are many and varied. In 
Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, the Ninth Circuit held that mushroom 
enthusiasts who became severely ill from picking and eating 
mushrooms after relying on faulty information in The Encyclopedia of 
Mushrooms could not recover tort damages because the First 
Amendment protected the publisher from negligence and products 
liability.173 Courts have also dismissed on First Amendment grounds 
tort cases brought on theories that speech inspired or influenced 
another to engage in tortious conduct.174 
 
 171. 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 172. See, e.g. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342–43 (9th Cir. 
1980); McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 504 (Fla. 1992) (discussing liability for 
providing a map that incorrectly indicated the location of an electric cable); Rozny v. Marnul, 
250 N.E.2d 656, 658–59 (Ill. 1969) (discussing liability for providing a defective survey map). 
 173. 938 F.2d 1033, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 174. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a 
magazine article on autoerotic asphyxia was entitled to First Amendment protection from 
liability because it did not “incite” adolescent’s death); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 
187 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that musical compositions expressing the view that suicide is an 
acceptable alternative to life were protected by the First Amendment from suit for wrongful 
death); Olivia N. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) (dismissing on First 
Amendment grounds a suit based on a sexual assault patterned on a similar assault portrayed in 
a television show). 
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Volokh has opined that liability in the aeronautical charts cases 
might be predicated on the immediacy of the need for the information 
provided.175 He has explained that: 
People use aeronautical charts not by considering whether to follow 
the charts’ advice, contemplating using a different chart, or deciding 
which of the charts’ many recommendations should be accepted. 
Chart users just apply the information given in the charts. Charts are 
authoritative, especially in an environment where quick decisions are 
necessary and lives are at stake.176 
That conclusion is somewhat plausible, though ultimately difficult 
to fit neatly with the outcomes of the cases. For example, some 
purchasers of a mushroom encyclopedia presumably purchase it with 
the specific intention of using it to sort safe mushrooms from deadly 
ones. Moreover, there have been cases in which courts have held that 
the First Amendment does not protect even highly speech-like (as 
opposed to product-like) speech. For example, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the First Amendment did not shield a publisher of the book 
Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors from tort 
liability for causing several individuals’ deaths when a reader used the 
manual to carry out a murder for hire.177 
Bargain fairness intersects with this area of law by positing that 
courts have difficulty with these cases because it is hard to determine 
which rule promotes bargain fairness. In the faulty technical 
instructions cases, the analysis is relatively easy. Individuals who 
purchased those products almost certainly would have demanded a 
warranty for the specific use to which they put the product if they had 
sufficient bargaining power. The cases become more difficult as the 
uses of a product become more variegated and the likelihood that 
every person in a broad class of consumers would demand the same 
contractual guarantee diminishes. Because not every purchaser of The 
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms purchases it for the purpose of using it as a 
guidebook for selecting safe wild mushrooms, it is not nearly as clear 
that such a warranty term is reasonable to impose. 
 
 175. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 112, 
119 (2014). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241–43 (4th Cir. 1997), rev’g 940 F. 
Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996). 
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It is worth noting that in the tort injury cases, courts are effectively 
using the background principles of tort law to override the equivalent 
of default warranty terms derived from the First Amendment.178 Given 
the arc of the case law, and the uncertainty in determining what the 
best rules of liability in such cases are, it is likely that if the legislature 
were to specifically enact a law making certain tort duties applicable 
to particular speech commodities in order to enhance bargain fairness, 
courts would more readily defer to that judgment. One might imagine 
that as long as a law reflected a reasonable decision about which rule 
would enhance the fairness of the bargain between the parties, the law 
would be upheld. 
IV. THE NORMATIVE APPEAL OF THE “FAIR BARGAIN” 
CONCEPTION 
The most fascinating aspect of the “fair bargain” conception is its 
apparently attenuated relationship with conventional First 
Amendment values—protection for democratic deliberation, the 
search for truth, individual autonomy, self-expression, tolerance, 
dissent, etc. Behind this apparent dissonance, however, lies a perfectly 
understandable logic. Namely, because speech is commodifiable at all, 
it must be subject to at least some minimal market regulation. Placing 
an order for a book and purchasing a ticket to a movie, for example, 
could not be done without at least some generally applicable 
commercial laws governing those transactions. 
A. Bargain Fairness as a Solution to the Market Norm vs. Speech Norm 
Dilemma 
Once neutral generally applicable principles governing market 
transactions are permitted—even occasionally—to restrain and restrict 
speech, however, the Court faces a dilemma. It must determine when 
to apply market norms to commoditized speech and when to apply 
speech norms. This question is especially difficult because many 
familiar neutral generally applicable principles governing market 
transactions specifically look to the nature of the commodity to 
determine the nature of the applicable rules. Determining whether a 
particular type of property is inalienable, for example, depends on 
 
 178. This would be an analogy to the idea that firms cannot waive personal injury liability 
in contracts of adhesion. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–96 (1966). 
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looking at the character of the property. Determining whether a 
product must be sold with a warning label requires an inquiry into the 
dangerousness of the product. Determining whether merchant rules 
should govern a transaction requires recourse to the identity of the 
parties to the transaction. Put simply, many typical market regulations 
are simultaneously “neutral” and “general,” and yet are “content” and 
“speaker-based” when applied to speech commodities because their 
application turns on the nature of the product and the parties to 
the transaction. 
Bargain fairness regulation is an accurate characterization of the 
rationale behind the Court’s determinations of which types of 
commoditized speech regulations are market regulations rather than 
speech regulations. By permitting regulations directed at the fairness of 
the bargain, the Court permits legislatures to engage in the types of 
regulations most common to typical market regulation. 
The Court was not compelled to draw the line at the fair bargain 
juncture. It could have treated all regulations of commoditized speech 
as speech regulations. Alternatively, it could have treated all 
regulations of commoditized speech as market regulations. Or it could 
have followed an eclectic path between the two. Instead, however, it 
appears that fair bargains are where the Court drew the line, and that 
decision is defensible. 
Before defending the fair bargain conception, it is worth pointing 
out the drawbacks that would have come from drawing a different 
line. If the Court had treated all commoditized speech regulation as 
subject to significant First Amendment scrutiny, the harms to social 
welfare would have been significant. For example, it is unclear how 
the Court could justify occupational licensing, lawsuits for legal 
malpractice, or the enforcement of most copyright law if 
commoditized speech regulations were subject to conventional First 
Amendment scrutiny. Similarly, if the Court had chosen to treat all 
regulation of commoditized speech as typical market regulation, it 
would be trivially easy for the government to engage in censorship 
through the vehicle of market regulation. The Government could 
restrict access to speech commodities for the same fanciful reasons it 
sometimes imposes regulations on traditional commodities, heedlessly 
censoring much speech at the core of the First Amendment. 
The Court might have chosen an eclectic approach—striking 
down some regulations and upholding others based on a balancing of 
interests—but familiar problems with incommensurability 
immediately would have arisen. An eclectic approach to analyzing the 
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First Amendment stakes of securities regulation, labor speech 
regulation, or workplace harassment would have required the Court 
to draw unpleasant lines. An eclectic approach would have required 
the Court to somehow balance society’s interest in economic welfare 
with an individual’s interest in freedom of expression case by case. 
Moreover, it would have required the court to justify the choice of 
balancing itself. Thus, an eclectic approach would have required the 
Court to explain how imposing categorical (or default) rules 
prohibiting certain kinds of speech would unduly harm freedom 
of expression. 
Bargain fairness sidesteps the balancing problems with the eclectic 
approach by eliminating the question of First Amendment values from 
the analysis at the outset. The proper question under fair bargain 
analysis is not whether the economic benefits from the regulation 
outweigh the First Amendment harms it imposes, but whether the 
regulation results in an economic benefit to the less powerful of the 
two parties to the bargain. Bargain fairness posits that any First 
Amendment harms are ameliorated by the fact that the two parties 
would willingly enter into the contract in any event and the only 
question is whether a term the less powerful party prefers will control. 
B. Other Benefits of Bargain Fairness  
Bargain fairness has at least three other virtues. First, the type of 
“balancing” analysis that it calls for involves a comparison of costs and 
benefits, and so does not require juggling incommensurables. Second, 
it places reasonably clear, identifiable limits on the boundaries of 
permissible government regulations of commoditized speech. Third, 
and most importantly, it poses little risk of spillover censorship. 
First, consider balancing. Balancing as a method of performing 
legal analysis has long been criticized because it is regarded as 
indeterminate and, even when honestly performed, beset by 
incommensurability problems.179 Balancing in the fair bargain context 
is not indeterminate, however, and does not involve 
incommensurables. Instead, balancing in the fair bargain context 
requires courts to determine the value of the speech being negotiated 
from the perspective of both parties to the bargain, and from that 
estimate, determine whether the regulation is designed to make the 
bargain materially fairer. Determining the value of the right to each 
 
 179. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
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party will involve judgment; so will determining whether the 
discrepancy between the value to the parties is too great to sustain. 
However, those types of judgments, which involve judgments of 
degree rather than comparisons of kind, are not susceptible to the 
same critiques as conventional balancing analysis. 
Second, consider clarity and predictability. Vindicating only those 
government regulations that approximate fair bargains sets clear 
identifiable limits on the permissible scope of government power to 
interfere with transactions involving commoditized speech. First, and 
most basically, fair bargain analysis is limited to circumstances in which 
there is a transactional relationship. Unless the government seeks to 
regulate an interaction between parties who seek to undertake a 
consensual commercial transaction, the government is subject to the 
fully panoply of First Amendment limits on its power to act. Second, 
transactional terms that do not reasonably approximate a fair bargain 
are unlawful. That limitation greatly circumscribes the kinds of 
substantive and procedural alterations the government may make to 
otherwise consensual transactions in which parties seek to alienate 
some aspect of their First Amendment rights. 
Third, consider the risk of spillover censorship. Regulation of the 
parties’ bilateral bargaining positions in the market is the least 
dangerous form of market regulation—it only imposes substantive 
values on the parties to the degree those values already reflect their 
preferences. Such regulations are designed to reflect the hypothetical 
interests of one of the parties, and not of the government. In the 
language of Solove and Richards, the government’s regulations are 
not thought to be problematic because they merely “backstop” 
private ordering.180 
C. Potential Limitations of the Bargain Fairness Model 
To be sure, bargain fairness, like all methods of deciding difficult 
and important legal questions, has drawbacks. Most prominently, it 
can be contended that “fairness” is a vague and manipulable concept. 
It could also be argued that the test permits the government to 
gradually eliminate disfavored speech from the marketplace. Finally, 
one might take the absolutist position that permitting speech to be 
extensively regulated anywhere places its protection at risk 
 
 180. Solove & Richards, supra note 23, at 1655. 
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everywhere. Nonetheless, each of those objections can be answered, 
even if not all of them can be entirely overcome. 
First, consider the supposed vagueness of “fairness.” Fairness and 
equity are vague concepts, so one might object that bargain fairness as 
a concept is so imprecise and malleable as to be meaningless. One 
might argue that what seems like a fair trade to one man seems like 
theft to another. That objection has some heft, though it ultimately 
misses the idea that “fairness” in this context is reasonably objective 
and definite. Courts are not balancing incommensurables, rather, they 
are approximating the value of the right to the speaker who is giving 
up her right to speak, and its value to her counterparty, who is 
receiving that promise. It is not difficult in most cases to determine 
when a law has been enacted to benefit one of the parties to a 
transaction and when, instead, it has been enacted for other purposes. 
Difficult cases can and do arise where legislatures pretend to enact 
laws that benefit one of the parties, when in fact neither party would 
favor the law in question. The objection in that situation, however, 
turns from a general objection to whether fairness can be applied in 
principle to a specific objection to its application in particular cases. 
Courts, however, engage in that sort of analysis routinely—they are 
often called upon to determine whether laws have a purpose or effect 
other than the one they purport to have. Thus, while the concept of a 
“fair bargain” may be vague and difficult to define, it is not an empty 
concept. As this Article has endeavored to show, the Court already 
applies it. 
Second, consider the incremental censorship objection. The fair 
bargain concept suffers from a slight circularity problem. When the 
government changes the circumstances of a particular contract or set 
of contracts through regulation, the relative value of the speech 
alienated in those relationships changes to reflect that change in 
baseline. To give one example, the imposition of privacy regulations 
in one sphere may make it appear unfair that such protective 
regulations have not been imposed in another sphere as well. As social 
conditions change due to regulations on commoditized speech, it may 
be that the existence of one set of regulations justifies the imposition 
of more regulations. One might argue that this result occurred in 
labor law, where enhancing the power of unions by restricting 
employer speech ultimately required some restrictions on union 
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speech to restore the balance.181 In that sense, the circularity problem 
might also be thought of as a kind of slippery-slope problem—as soon 
as commoditized speech is regulated, it will be difficult to draw lines 
against additional regulation.  
The circularity or slippery-slope issue is a real one. Terms that 
seem fair against one baseline can come to seem unfair as the baseline 
moves. The result could eventually be that an area that was once 
entirely free from government regulation could come to be almost 
totally coopted by government regulation as each small regulatory 
change comes to justify the next incremental change. When laws are 
reviewed on the basis of present expectations, or present market value, 
they risk this form of regulatory creep. Nonetheless, the circularity 
issue might be overblown. Social expectations exist in a constant state 
of flux, and there is not necessarily any objectively appropriate level of 
legal regulation in any particular area at any particular time. Presentist 
tests, like the bargain fairness test, have the virtue of vindicating 
contemporary values without upsetting settled social expectations by 
attempting to restore outdated norms. In that sense, circularity can be 
as much a virtue as a vice. 
Third, consider the absolutist objection: permitting the extensive 
regulation of speech anywhere places it at risk everywhere. One might 
argue that permitting speech regulation on the basis of bargain fairness 
poses a grave danger that courts will overlook the important 
substantive stakes of permitting content-based regulation. Speech is 
not just property. Who may speak and what they may say has a 
profound impact on every aspect of society—from who is elected to 
political office to what values society decides are worth pursuing. 
When courts permit the government to restrict or regulate speech on 
the basis of its commercial or propertarian properties, they risk losing 
sight of the fact that it possesses the dual aspect of informing and 
influencing the rest of society. 
There are two replies to that critique. The first is that that 
argument can be leveled against any restriction or restraint on speech, 
not just restrictions justified on fair bargain grounds. The central 
problem society confronts in determining how to implement the First 
Amendment is recognizing that speech always has a multifarious 
 
 181. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1783 (“In some contexts unions may say and do things 
that employers may not, and in other contexts employers may say and do things that unions may 
not—the two schemes together constituting a complex but content-based system of government 
regulation of speech.”). 
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character. Even the most valuable speech might, by virtue of its form 
or content, be justifiably suppressed. The second reply is that speech 
is not the only form of property that has a dual nature. Physical 
property has significant expressive importance and plays an essential 
role in structuring society, but the government has a free hand to 
regulate it. Given that property regulation has done a decent job 
respecting the multifaceted nature of property, it is at least possible to 
argue that speech regulation justified on commercial grounds can 
nonetheless respect the multifaceted nature of speech. Ultimately the 
benefit of permitting bargain fairness regulation—its tendency to 
advance social welfare—may far outweigh its incidental effects 
on speech. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article sought to develop a theory of the appropriate role of 
the First Amendment in governing the regulation of commoditized 
speech, namely, that courts should apply a “bargain fairness” model 
when reviewing such regulations. Speech regulations that merely 
enhance the bargaining power of one of the parties to a transaction 
should be upheld, while regulations that have other purposes and 
effects should be struck down. The Court’s cases involving the 
regulation of commoditized speech are well-explained by that 
implicit concern. 
If the Court were to openly embrace fair bargain analysis, it might 
improve its application in two ways. First, the Court might take 
advantage of available comparators to better determine the value of 
the speech at stake. For example, where an industry has adopted an 
industry standard practice, the government could intervene to make 
that standard practice compulsory, thereby protecting consumers from 
firms that deviate from the industry norm. Courts could also look to 
other industries or nations to determine how consumer expectations 
interact with certain kinds of industry regulation. The resulting 
increase in judicial accuracy could help courts distinguish between 
genuine bargain-fairness-enhancing laws and those that seek to use 
bargain fairness as a pretext for substantive censorship. A second way 
the Court could improve its analysis might be to consider economic 
evidence to determine whether regulations are appropriate. For 
example, it could look at survey evidence, or natural experiments, to 
determine whether less powerful parties (like consumers and 
employees) truly would like to see certain regulations enacted. Again, 
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such analysis could help to prevent the misuse of bargain fairness as a 
covert means of impermissible censorship. 
The government’s power to regulate commoditized speech is 
broad, but carefully circumscribed. As a normative matter, the Court 
has taken a defensible position in carving out a space for laws that 
enhance bargain fairness, straddling the uneasy line between 
appropriate concern for social welfare and the preservation of 
important First Amendment values. 
 
